April 20th, 2012 by Eric Miller under Faculty Commentary. No Comments.
By Phillip Swagel, CFP Academic Fellow and International Economics Professor at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy
This article originally was featured on RealClearMarkets.com on April 18, 2012.
The financial crisis left the biggest U.S. banks bigger, and amplified concerns that these banks are TBTF: “Too Big to Fail.” Calls for action to address TBTF were given considerable impetus by the recent annual report of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, which asserted that “the vitality of our capitalist system” and “long-term prosperity” depend on eliminating TBTF. This in turn, according to the Dallas Fed, requires “breaking up the nation’s biggest banks into smaller units.”
The U.S. banking system is indeed dominated by six large firms accounting for more than half of bank assets. JPMorgan Chase and Bank of America had assets of more than $2 trillion each as of the end of 2011; Citigroup and Wells Fargo had more than $1 trillion each in assets; and Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley (formerly investment banks recast during the crisis as bank holding companies) weighed in at $950 and 800 billion, respectively. No other commercial bank comes close: the next largest has less than $400 billion in assets.
To be sure, there are many other large financial firms besides banks, including insurers and asset managers. But banks are special in that they intentionally undertake the risky activity of borrowing short-term money (deposits and other sources of funding) in order to invest in longer-term assets (such as making 30-year loans to homeowners). This maturity transformation at the heart of banking creates particular vulnerabilities to panics in which losses erode capital and confidence, and then funding vanishes and firms implode. This is a sadly familiar story, which too often during the recent financial crisis resulted in huge infusions of taxpayer money. The desire to end bailouts motivates many proposals to limit bank size.
Various provisions of the Dodd-Frank financial regulatory reform law and other regulatory initiatives such as the Basel III Accord impact large banks. Banks must hold more capital and ensure better access to liquidity. And then with the largest firms, those with assets of $50 billion or more, they’re subject to an enhanced supervisory regime that includes both additional capital charges and other aspects of increased regulatory scrutiny. These steps are meant to ensure that firms have an increased buffer against losses and a greater ability to survive the strains of a future crisis, and thus to provide increased protection for taxpayers. Banks further face restrictions on their activities, notably including a prohibition on proprietary trading under the Volcker Rule. These measures provide a disincentive against size, though not an outright limit.
While Dodd-Frank does not actively seek to break up large banks, the recent regulatory process appears cognizant of the potential dangers posed by large financial institutions. The Federal Reserve’s lengthy examination of the acquisition of ING Direct by Capital One, for example, suggested that regulators are wary of acquisitions that add bulk to already-large banks.
Still, the concern remains that policymakers will inevitably be forced to prop up a sufficiently large bank due to fear about the consequences of a failure. Hence the calls remain for further action to address TBTF.
What is sometimes overlooked in the discussion of TBTF is that the new orderly liquidation authority in Title II of Dodd-Frank fundamentally changes the way in which future problems at large financial institutions will be handled, and that this in turn has a profound impact even today, before a crisis. The Dodd-Frank resolution authority makes clear to bondholders and other creditors that they will take losses if a firm fails. Government money can be used to support a firm, but these funds must then be repaid by bondholders after shareholders are wiped out. Absent additional Congressional action (which is hard to imagine given the unpopularity of the TARP), a future failure of a large financial institution will involve losses for bondholders. This contrasts with what generally happened during the recent crisis, in which support for bondholders was the most common bailout.
While it is difficult to know in advance how the resolution authority will be used, it seems likely that the experience of the problems following Lehman’s demise will lead the FDIC, which will typically be in charge, to initially deploy government funds to keep a firm in operation in resolution. The FDIC might then arrange a debt-for-equity swap that recapitalizes the failing firm, with the former bondholders as the new owners.
This would be similar to a pre-packaged Chapter 11 reorganization under the bankruptcy code, though the Title II authorities would allow this to be done faster and with the government providing the equivalent of debtor-in-possession financing. Losses ultimately would be borne by bondholders.
The resolution authority provides government officials with an open checkbook to act through the troubled firm, with bondholders picking up the tab. The legislation seeks to narrow the scope of action for the FDIC in resolution by guaranteeing bondholders that they will receive as much in resolution as would have been the case under bankruptcy. Of course this still gives worrisome scope for mischief on the part of policymakers.
The key reason while resolution authority gets at TBTF is that the near-certainty of taking losses translates into higher funding costs even in normal times (with no crisis). This reduces or even reverses the previous advantage of large firms reflecting the belief that bondholders would be bailed out. There will still be government action if large banks get into trouble: indeed, Dodd-Frank institutionalizes the intervention. But losses will be imposed. Ending the bailout of creditors such as bondholders removes a key problem of having institutions that are too big to fail.
The regulatory regime for large, complex financial institutions is in the process of a vast change from the system that prevailed before the financial crisis. Firms will be required to hold more capital, have more robust access to liquidity, receive increased regulatory scrutiny, and face restrictions on their activities. These changes will involve costs and benefits. Higher capital and liquidity requirements, for example, will affect lending activity and thus the overall economy, but the quantitative impact remains to be seen.
The Dodd-Frank legislation has many problems and omissions, and much is still uncertain about implementation. But the new liquidation authority provides for the possibility of making it so that future crises do not involve the bailouts of creditors that truly embodied the problem of having banks that are too big to fail.
Phillip Swagel is a non-resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and a professor at the University of Maryland’s School of Public Policy, where he teaches courses on international economics and is a faculty associate of the Center for Financial Policy at the Robert H. Smith School of Business. He was Assistant Secretary for Economic Policy at the Treasury Department from December 2006 to January 2009.
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Tags:center for financial policy, swagel, systemic risk, too big to fail, University of Maryland.
April 18th, 2012 by Eric Miller under Faculty Commentary. No Comments.
by Bill Longbrake, Executive-in-Residence, Center for Financial Policy
This is an excerpt of the April 2012 Longbrake Letter. To read the letter in its entirety, click here.
Last month I referred to the economy’s strong start in 2011 and commented that once again optimism, like spring flowers, is blossoming. I posed the question whether 2012’s strong start might fade as the year progressed.
In pondering this question it is important not to lose sight of the severe damage the credit and housing bubbles inflicted on the economy. Healing is occurring but the patient remains in serious condition. While that is far better than being in critical condition, it means that the economy remains quite vulnerable to negative shocks.
U.S. March data reports have been somewhat weaker than January and February’s reports. The 120,000 increase in employment in March after six months averaging above 200,000 was a clear disappointment. While some might dismiss the weak employment report as a “bump in the road”, it is a reminder that the economy remains fragile and that the road to recovery is likely to be filled with many bumps and potholes. Or, put in economists’ language, recession is unlikely, but growth is likely to be feeble with the result that the large GDP output gap and sizeable level of unemployment will diminish only very gradually.
As often happens when data reports don’t meet expectations, the initial response of many market participants is to try to explain them away and discount their significance. This denial process started almost immediately after release of the employment report on April 6, 2012. However, denial cannot persist if other reports corroborate the initial surprise. The release of the monthly National Federal of Small Business (NFIB) report on April 10, 2012 was surprisingly negative and corroborated renewed labor market weakness. Generally, the market does not pay much attention to this survey. But, the NFIB overall index fell from 94.3 in February to 92.5 in March. It was expected to rise to 95. Details were grim. All ten sub-indices worsened. While small businesses increased employment an average of .22 workers per firm in March, up from zero in January, plans to increase hiring in the future fell from 4% to zero. This was followed by an unexpected rise in the weekly unemployment claims number.
In Europe, as expected, recession is developing. And, as feared, early indications are that the recession will be more severe than official forecasts. In recent days, Spain’s auction of sovereign debt was not well received. Yields on Spanish 10-year debt have climbed 115 basis points to 5.92% since the recent low in February. European bank stock prices have declined 14% in recent days, including a 4.6% drop on April 10, although there has been a modest rebound since then.
Read more…
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Tags:center for financial policy, employment, longbrake, macroeconomics, recession, University of Maryland.
March 26th, 2012 by Eric Miller under Faculty Commentary. 1 Comment.
by Bill Longbrake, Executive-in-Residence, Center for Financial Policy
This is an excerpt of the March 2012 Longbrake Letter. To read the letter in its entirety, click here.
Imbalances in the Chinese economy continue to grow. An increasing share of Chinese GDP comes from investment in infrastructure. And a massive property bubble is unwinding. The question is whether the necessary transition will be managed and orderly or whether it will be disorderly and disruptive. What we know from past experience is that the longer these imbalances continue to build, the greater will be the correction whenever it eventually occurs. There is evidence that China is in the early stages of attempting to manage an orderly transition. Because the Chinese economy relies heavily on exports slowing global growth will have immediate consequences. In this regard a strengthening U.S. economy and the improvement in Europe’s near-term outlook is a welcome development.
Acknowledging these developments China officially lowered its 2012 growth target to 7.5%. This does not mean it expects growth to fall to this level. It has always been China’s policy to announce a target growth rate that it expects to be able to exceed. However, the importance of the announcement is the recognition that as the Chinese economy matures and transforms from an export-infrastructure economy to a consumer economy, the rate of growth, while still high, is likely to be lower than in recent years.
With the exception of oil the recent softening in commodity prices may be an indicator of slowing Chinese growth. There are many stories of unutilized infrastructure projects and there is anecdotal commentary that while infrastructure projects in progress are being completed, few new projects are being initiated.
While many believe that China continues to manipulate the value of the yuan to support its export-based economic strategy, recent currency market forward contracts suggest this may no longer be the case. Forwards are actually predicting depreciation in the yuan in coming months rather than appreciation. Supporting evidence is a shrinkage in China’s trade surplus and foreign exchange reserves. A shrinkage in foreign exchange reserves suggests China may be trying to support the value of the yuan rather than increase it.
Could it be that Chinese growth has been impacted to a greater extent by the global growth slowdown and the unwinding of its property bubble than market participants believe?
One analyst posed a speculative analysis which, if correct, portends a deeper slowdown in Chinese growth during 2012. The analysis begins with an assumption that real estate investment accounts for approximately 10% of GDP. Apparently, there is basis for this to be a reasonably accurate figure. Then, if one assumes that real estate investment grew 30% in 2011 but falls to 0% in 2012 and all other economic activity grows at the same rate in both years, GDP would fall from 8.5% for 2011 to 5.5% in 2012. This is simple math and may be wrong but it illustrates the vulnerability of Chinese growth to an outsized reliance on real estate investment and a crash in that activity. There is plenty of evidence that real estate activity has slowed dramatically but Chinese data are not transparent, so it is difficult to discern whether the consequences will be as great at the thought experiment above suggests they might be.
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Tags:center for financial policy, China, longbrake, macroeconomics.
March 9th, 2012 by Eric Miller under Faculty Commentary. No Comments.
Lemma W. Senbet
William E. Mayer Chair Professor of Finance and
Director of the Center for Financial Policy at the University
of Maryland’s Robert H. Smith School of Business
Lemma Senbet reviewed Robert J. Shiller’s book, Finance and the Good Society, for Finance & Development March 2012, a quarterly magazine of the IMF.
Finance and the Good Society by Robert J. Shiller
Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 2012, 304 pp., $24.95 (cloth).
In the wake of the crisis, I was a speaker at a seminar for senior African financial policymakers—to whom donors and international financial institutions had preached the virtue of financial capitalism. How was it, they asked, that the United States, which had been lauding the benefits of financial capitalism and privatization, was now nationalizing venerable entities such as AIG and Fannie Mae?
The collateral damage from the crisis has extended beyond sharp declines in trade and capital flows. It includes increasing hostility to the market economy itself. Robert Shiller’s thoughtful analysis of the beneficial social consequences of financial capitalism then is timely.
The book draws from Shiller’s rich background in finance and behavioral finance—where he has made landmark contributions—and his extensive reading in other fields, including economics, modern financial theory, behavior economics, history, psychology, sociology, and political science. This makes his analysis of finance truly interdisciplinary.
To a finance specialist, the perspectives that the author brings from the other fields contextualize many ideas that are widely and separately held by finance professionals with a silo mentality.
The digressions are fascinating—for example, the discussion on “goals and our lives” seems inspired by spirituality and Zen Buddhism—but at times he goes too far afield in discussing nonfinancial areas, and the thesis of the book—a defense of the social good of finance—is lost.
Shiller advances the need to democratize and humanize financial capitalism. His book is anchored by advances in modern finance, including financial innovation, market efficiency, financial incentives, and conflicting interests among stakeholders vis-à-vis modern corporations. Shiller argues for a broader role for finance beyond mere money making.
The author is not averse to money making, but in his analysis of the human instinct behind it, he argues that money is a means to produce positive externalities. One might invoke charitable giving, but Shiller illustrates the broader social dimension of finance that pervades our lives consciously and unconsciously. Why are the superwealthy resented? Why do we have “occupy” movements? How do the superwealthy fit into Shiller’s idealized world of democratized financial capitalism?
Shiller’s answers are, at times, provocative. The logical conclusion of Marxist thought is the self-destruction of capitalism. However, capitalism, particularly financial capitalism, has survived and even improved over the years, according to Shiller. Moreover, financial capitalism has survived modern information technology, which the author believes will leverage human capacity and accelerate the democratization of finance.
Many countervailing forces have evolved over the years to inspire a wider sense of social ownership of financial capitalism, such as employee stock ownership plans, retirement savings through wider stock and financial asset holdings, financial regulation, and corporate governance schemes to rein in the excesses of financial capitalism.
Marx did not predict such countervailing forces. Democratization of finance reduces resentment to financial capitalism. In fact, in such a setting it is not hard to imagine an environment where the superwealthy are welcome so long as they make their fortunes fairly by following the rules of the game.
Shiller also advances the idea of humanizing finance by exploiting human impulses (both positive and negative) and explores how those instincts might be used to encourage the very rich to view their wealth accumulation as a source for the greater good. So while finance can engender excesses, it can also be an engine of growth and poverty alleviation.
The book promotes a form of financial capitalism that fosters such social good. The goal is broad and the approach interdisciplinary, and Shiller is uniquely suited to provide such rich interdisciplinary analysis.
Although the book is anchored by advances in modern finance, the first part is devoted to a myriad of actors in the financial system and their roles and responsibilities. This is an excellent tutorial for those who have no substantial familiarity with finance. There are about 20 classes of actors, including CEOs, investment bankers, lawyers, traders, insurers, and even lobbyists and philanthropists.
The book is organized in a way that is useful to the understanding of specific roles and responsibilities, but I would have preferred to see it organized according to functions within the world of finance, such as savings and capital mobilization, information production, financial intermediation, risk sharing and management, and governance.
The book also advocates too much dependence on government. The author proposes a number of innovative schemes for government to implement, such as futures contracts on nonstandard products. Such proposals raise misgivings about encouraging heavy-handed government intervention.
I would also have liked to see more on the role of incentives and corporate governance in fostering finance for the social good. The size and incentive features of executive compensation have played prominently in current regulatory debates, but the book has very little to say about this. In fact, the issue of inequality of wealth and income has been attributed, in some circles, to the distorted incentives in executive pay.
These shortcomings apart, the book is eminently readable. Although the thesis is explained intuitively with very little data and complicated methodologies, the multitude of anecdotes and analogies drawn from various disciplines are powerful and encourage the reader to think laterally. Shiller should be applauded not only for advancing the democratization of financial capitalism but also for helping democratize knowledge of finance.
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Tags:Book Review, center for financial policy, Emerging Economies, Finance and Development, IMF, Lemma Senbet, Robert Schiller.
February 17th, 2012 by Eric Miller under Faculty Commentary. No Comments.
by Bill Longbrake
Executive-in-Residence
Center for Financial Policy
This is an excerpt of the February 2012 Longbrake Letter. To read the letter in its entirety, click here.
Occupy Wall Street has helped focus attention on growing income and wealth inequality – “we are the 99%”.
Two papers, one a theoretical economic analysis prepared by two International Monetary Fund economists, Michael Kumhof and Romain Ranciere[1], and the other a white paper authored by Anant Thaker of the Boston Consulting Group and Elizabeth Williamson of the Frontenac Company[2], assert that the 2007-09 financial and economic crises was a direct outcome of income and wealth inequality that built up over 40 years.
Data. Kumhof and Ranciere provide time series data for the share of income received by the top 5%.
These data indicate the following for share of income earned by the top 5%:
- 1920 – 24%
- 1929 – 34%
- 1983 – 22%
- 2007 – 34%
During the same two periods (1920 to 1932 and 1983 to 2007) Kumhof and Ranciere found that the ratio of household debt to GDP nearly doubled in the earlier period and more than doubled in the latter period and reached a higher level in 2007 than in 1932.
Thaker and Williamson report share of income data for the top 1%, which was originally compiled by Piketty and Saez, but updated by Thaker and Williamson:[3]
- 1920 – 16%
- 1929 – 24%
- 1968 – 8%
- 2007 – 24%
Piketty and Saez use two different data series to track the debt to GDP ratio. The earlier series is individual and non-corporate private debt to GDP and the recent series is the more common ratio of household debt to GDP:
- 1920 – 60% (individual and non-corporate private debt to GDP)
- 1932 – 95% (individual and non-corporate private debt to GDP)
- 1968 – 60% (individual and non-corporate private debt to GDP)
- 1968 – 40% (household debt to GDP)
- 2007 – 95% (household debt to GDP)
The pattern in both measures in the years preceding crisis is clear and eerily similar.
Mechanism through Which Growing Income Inequality Leads to Financial Crisis. The triggering event is a shift in relative income bargaining power in favor of the top 5% relative to the bottom 95%. This initial shift in bargaining power sets in motion a series of events that takes decades to develop.
First, as the share of income of the bottom 95% shrinks that group attempts to maintain consumption through borrowing. Second, as the top 5% gains income, and thus wealth, that group needs to find ways to invest its accumulating wealth. Accordingly, it provides the funds that the bottom 95% borrows.
Borrowing is enabled by financial innovation, such as subprime mortgages and home equity loans in recent times. All of this activity facilitates tremendous growth in the financial sector of the economy.
As the financial sector grows relative to the rest of the economy its political power grows as well. This leads to adoption of policies that promote and protect the interests of the financial elite, which in turn tends to reinforce the building inequality. One can place deregulation, reduced capital requirements and other “free market” elements into this basket.
Financial crisis eventually erupts because there is an ultimate limit to how much debt households can support. Increases in debt and decreases in savings reduce a household’s ability to manage through a life crisis – illness, loss of job, divorce and so forth.
Sum this increase in financial vulnerability across millions of households and in the aggregate the economy’s ability to withstand a shock, such as a sudden and sharp increase in oil prices, steadily erodes. Also, as we now know, runaway speculation in housing propelled a bubble in prices which was aided and abetted by abundant and cheap debt, steadily diminishing credit underwriting standards, and a laissez-faire attitude on the part of government regulators perhaps swayed by the belief in “The Market” as an efficient regulator or perhaps inhibited by the political power of the financial elite.
And, as I have opined frequently, the greater are the excesses during the bubble period, the harder will be the crash when it eventually unfolds. The same is true for income inequality. As income inequality escalates, the macro economy becomes increasingly fragile. The crash, when it finally arrives, is horrific and the convalescence period is painful and extended.
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[1] Michael Kumhof and Romain Ranciere. “Inequality, Leverage and Crises.” International Monetary Fund Working Paper, November 2010.
[2] Anant A. Thaker and Elizabeth C. Williamson. “Unequal and Unstable: The Relationship Between Inequality and Financial Crises.” New America Foundation. January 2012.
[3] T. Piketty and E. Saez. ‘Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-1998.”Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1), 2003, pp. 1-23, with updated data to 2008: U.S. Census Bureau; U.S. Federal Reserve Flow of Funds; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Tags:financial crisis, income inequality, longbrake.
February 9th, 2012 by Eric Miller under Faculty Commentary. No Comments.
By Phillip Swagel, CFP Academic Fellow and International Economics Professor at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy
This is an excerpt from Professor Swagel’s February 9, 2012 testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. To read his full testimony, click here.
The continued weak state of the housing market and the toll of millions of foreclosures already, millions more families still at risk of losing their home, and trillions of dollars of lost wealth all reflect the lingering impact of the collapse of the housing bubble and ensuing financial crisis. A range of policies have been undertaken over the past several years aimed at the housing market—a recent summary from the Department of Housing and Urban Development lists 10 separate policy actions.[1] These can be grouped into two broad categories. What might be seen as “backward-looking” policies seek to avoid foreclosures on past home purchases through actions such as incentives for mortgage modifications and refinancing. By avoiding foreclosures, these policies both assist individual families and help reduce the supply of homes for sale (and in the overhang of the so-called “shadow inventory”) and thus reduce downward pressures on home prices that in turn affect household wealth and the broad economy. In contrast, “forward-looking” policies seek to boost demand for home purchases, such as with the first time homebuyer tax credit and the Federal Reserve’s purchases of mortgage-backed securities (MBS).
The common feature of these housing policies is their limited effectiveness. To be sure, these policies have done something: MBS purchases resulted in lower interest rates for families buying a home or refinancing a mortgage; some 930,000 homeowners have benefited from permanent mortgage modifications through the HAMP program; and so on. But relative to the scale of the weakness in home prices and housing market demand, and especially compared to the tragically huge number of foreclosures, the set of housing market policies to date appears to have underperformed compared to expectation set at each policy unveiling. Moreover, these programs have involved considerable costs for taxpayers, with the benefits accruing mainly to a relatively small group of recipients. And on top of the millions of foreclosures not prevented by the policies of the past several years, there is likely another huge wave of foreclosures set to take place in the next year or two, with many of these representing foreclosures that were delayed but not ultimately prevented by policies to date.
This experience is important to keep in mind as the Congress contemplates a range of new and expanded housing policy proposals from the administration, along with a white paper from the Federal Reserve that covers similar ground. Broadly speaking, the proposed actions look to provide homeowners with reduced monthly payments through government-assisted refinances; to lower principal mortgage balances; and to speed the pace at which vacant homes become rentals. The goal, as with all policies throughout the crisis, is to have fewer foreclosures and stronger consumer spending. These policies are well-intentioned.
Unfortunately, there is every reason to believe that the new policy proposals for streamlined refinancing and principal reduction are likely to have the same modest impact—and at an even worse tradeoff in terms of cost to taxpayers for each foreclosure avoided than for the policies to date. Simply put, we have learned that mortgage modification programs are difficult to implement and execute because of the intrinsically one-at-a-time nature of the transactions involved. And the expansions of some programs, such as considerably increased payments from the government to motivate reductions in mortgage principal, face less promising conditions now for being effective than was the case when many of these policies were launched in early 2009. Three years of a weak job market have forced many of the borrowers who might have been helped by reduced payments or a lower mortgage balance into foreclosure.
There are other approaches that can be taken to help heal the housing market and speed the recovery of home prices and construction while reducing the pain for American families. This testimony first provides a critical analysis of recent policy proposals and then discusses alternative steps that the Congress might consider. The goal of these policies is for the housing sector to once again contribute positively to the U.S. economy and to American society—to have a housing system that works for families looking to buy homes, for investors with funds to lend, and for taxpayers who deserve a stable financial system and protection from another expensive bailout.
To read more, click here.
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[1] See the appendix of the January 2012 HUD-Treasury Housing Scorecard: http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=JanNat2012_Scorecard.pdf
Tags:Housing, senate hearing, swagel, testimony.
